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Implications of EMU for the European Community 
CHRIS KIRRANE 
 
Abstract 
Monetary integration has both costs and benefits. Europeans have a strong aversion to exchange rate 
instability. From this perspective, the EMS has shown its limits and full monetary union involving a single 
currency appears to be a necessity. This is the goal of the EMU project contained in the Maastricht 
Treaty. This paper examines the pertinent choices: independence of the Central Bank, budgetary 
discipline and economic policy coordination. Therefore, the implications of EMU for the economic policy 
of France will be examined. If the external force disappears, the public sector still cannot circumvent its 
solvency constraint. The instrument of national monetary policy will not be available so the absorption 
of asymmetric shocks will require greater wage flexibility and fiscal policy will play a greater role. 
The paper includes three parts. The first concerns the economic foundations of monetary union and the 
costs it entails. The second is devoted to the institutional arrangements under the Treaty of Maastricht. 
The third examines the consequences of monetary union for the economy and the economic policy of 
France. 
Why EMU? 
Monetary union, which can be characterised by the combination of the freedom of capital movements 
and irrevocable exchange rates is one of the possible monetary regimes for economically highly 
integrated nations. A high degree of integration of the goods market, such as that seen in the countries 
of the European Community, does not automatically imply that choice. It is, in reality, the preference of 
Europeans for exchange rate stability that creates a link between the single market and monetary union. 
This preference has been repeatedly demonstrated since the abandonment of the Bretton Woods 
system through the establishment of the European currency snake and that of the European Monetary 
System.  
It explains the micro-economic point of view (because the fixed exchange rate promotes economic 
integration), the macro-economic point of view (because it prevents non-cooperative attitudes), and 
also by institutional factors common policy management as in the CAP.1 
Unlike economic integration theory that stresses unambiguous benefits, monetary union has costs 
(Mundell, (1961)). Economic analysis does not quantify the costs and benefits associated with the choice 
of exchange rate regime. At most it allows partial assessments (Emerson et al. (1991)). However, it 
provides guidance for establishing an objective balance of pros and cons to decide if this plan is or is not 
preferable to the others, particularly the current monetary regime of the majority of countries of the 
European Community: the EMS 
 
 
                                               
1
 See, on this point, Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989). 
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Advantages and disadvantages of monetary union 
The main economic reason for adopting a monetary union regime is micro-economic. The uncertainty 
about exchange rates is an obstacle to economic integration and the manifestation of welfare gains it 
provides. Historical observation shows that periods of floating exchange rates also correspond to 
periods of heavy unanticipated changes in real the exchange rate (Mussa (1986), Krugman (1989)). 
However, the direction of causality is certainly not absolutely established: the abandonment of the fixed 
exchange rate system in 1973 and the generalised floating of currencies are probably the result of 
accumulated tension in economies with nominal rigidities, the resolution increased the flexibility of 
exchange rates. But after twenty years of experience of floating exchange rates, there is little doubt that 
this diet leads to excessive volatility of exchange rates and the emergence of lasting misalignments. 
Note however that micro-economic benefits of fixed exchange rates are not easily measurable. Thus, 
despite a lot of research on this issue, it is not empirically shown that the variability of nominal exchange 
rates led to a significant reduction in the volume of international trade (in the case of the EMS, see Sapir 
and Sekkat (1993)). As for the efficiency gains that the single currency could provide in promoting the 
integration of capital markets by eliminating distortions in the allocation of investments, stimulating 
competition and reducing the weight of uncertainty in investment decisions, they are hardly measurable 
(Baldwin (1991)). 
The macro-economic benefits of monetary union belong, in turn, to strategic type considerations or, 
more broadly, to the political economy. It is well known that the choice of exchange rate regime is often 
inspired by such considerations (Argy (1989)), and this is verified with the EMS (Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1988)). In this perspective, monetary union is one of the ways of ensuring price stability, eliminating the 
risk of non-cooperative policy (see Kirrane [1993]), or promoting good management of public finances 
(Emerson et al. (1991)). In this matter, however, the costs and benefits depend on the alternative to 
monetary union and the quality of its constitutive principles. They are obviously not the same for 
Germany and Italy. 
In the European case, monetary union should finally lead to the emergence of a European currency 
likely to compete with the dollar in its international currency functions. Economic gains related to the 
acquisition of such a status of international currency, however, are limited, at least in the medium term 
(Emerson et al (1991). Kenen (1993); Bénassy, Italianer and Pisani-Ferry (1993)). In the longer term, it is 
likely that the emergence of a multipolar currency world would be a factor of stability in a global 
economy where the economic weight of the United States is declining. 
These potential advantages of monetary union must be weighed against the disadvantages resulting 
from the loss of autonomy in economic policy. It is indeed not possible to maintain an independent 
monetary policy if it is desired at the same time to maintain fixed exchange rates and the absence of 
hindrance to all capital movements (Padoa-Schioppa (1987)). Fiscal policy itself saw its margins reduced 
to the extent that monetary financing is banned, where the use of monetisation of debt is excluded, and 
where seigniorage is reduced (for the most inflationary countries) through the implied acceptance of a 
single inflation rate only compatible with fixed exchange rates. In the case of EMU, it is further limited 
by the principle that excessive deficits should be avoided.  
It is known from Mundell (1961), the costs of this loss of autonomy depends on the distribution of 
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disturbances affecting economies. As with any monetary rule, the choice of exchange rate regime is 
based on the nature and distribution of shocks that may jeopardise macroeconomic stability (Marston 
(1985)). In the case of monetary union, the key is whether the shocks are symmetric or asymmetric. In 
the first case, monetary union has only benefits because the fixed exchange rate plays as a substitute for 
cooperation and excludes non-cooperative behaviour. Participating countries all practice the same 
policy, which is also the desirable policy at the global level. However, if shocks are asymmetrical (by 
their origin or because of structural differences between countries), the lack of autonomy of monetary 
policy becomes a disadvantage. Debated somewhat abstractly by economists, this notion of ‘asymmetric 
shock’ found two striking illustrations with German unification and the savings behavior of British 
households. It was the magnitude of this asymmetry and the divergence of monetary policy responses 
that caused the UK, in September 1992, to make a forced exit from the EMS. 
Many studies have been devoted to the identification of shocks within the European Community, 
particularly in a comparative perspective with the United States (see in particular Bayoumi and Masson 
(1991); Bayoumi and Eichen- Green (1992)). They usually lead to the conclusion that symmetric shocks 
dominate but that asymmetry is higher in the European Community and within the United States or 
Canada. 
The dismantling of exchange rate controls raises risks to a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates. 
To ensure exchange rate stability permanently, exchange rates must be irrevocably fixed. For this to 
happen, the EMS needs to have to a single monetary policy and thus a single currency regime. 
From EMS to Monetary union  
Monetary union should not be assessed in the abstract, but in reference to the EMS. Three main 
criticisms can be made about this regime. 
First, the EMS has explicit goals of limited ambition (stabilisation of exchange rates, prohibition of 
competitive devaluations). Implicit rules have emerged during the period 1985-1992 (spacing 
realignments and incomplete correction of accumulated inflation differentials; see about Emerson et al 
(1991).) But their status is uncertain. The currency crisis of 1992-1993 could also lead to a change of 
system management principles, as proposed by the Monetary Committee of the Community (1993). 
Recent developments show that the ‘new EMS’ for years 1987-1992 (Giavazzi and Spaventa (1990)) had 
more dangers than previously believed. In fact, the EMS is primarily a monetary arrangement, and price 
stability is not one of the stated objectives of the system, although there is agreement that it played an 
important role in the decline inflation (Vissol (1990)). Now it is part of the objectives of EMU. Better 
integration of economic and monetary policy in EMU is expected to achieve the general economic 
objectives more effectively. Monetary policy should, in principle, take into account economic policies 
determined by the political authority 2 insofar as the objective of price stability is not jeopardised. 
Secondly, even if it is rules-based and with balanced obligations, the EMS is characterised by asymmetry 
ever since the evolution of monetary policy gave the German mark the role of an anchor currency 
(around 1987 following the study of Weber (1990). Thus German monetary policy determines the key 
interest rates of other member countries and is mainly driven by exchange rate considerations. The 
                                               
2
 According to the Treaty on European Union, general economic policies must be decided by qualified majority by 
the Council, following the purposely rations of the European Council. 
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hypothesis of German domination is certainly not confirmed by analysis of its strict version (Frattiani 
and von Hagen (1992)), probably because of capital controls, the flexibility provided by the bands of 
fluctuation and changes in risk premiums. Indirect evidence, however, leads one to consider that the 
Bundesbank plays a central role in the system.  
Now if this asymmetry could lend credibility to disinflation policies3, it becomes sub-optimal from the 
time when many countries have achieved a satisfactory degree of price stability. The conduct of German 
monetary policy over the past two years shows clearly that where the occurrence of shocks affecting 
different countries unevenly, optimal monetary policy for a particular country (given the stance of fiscal 
policy) is suboptimal for the European Community as a whole. The role of an anchor currency-is also not 
without inconvenience to the Bundesbank itself whose monetary policy can be disrupted by the 
internationalisation of the mark (Köhler (1993)). The goal of the EMU is to establish a common monetary 
policy while retaining the benefit of price stability. 
Finally, the events since September 1992 raise questions about the stability of the EMS. It is known from 
Obstfeld (1988) that speculative attacks were possible. Official reports (Padoa Schioppa (1987), Emerson 
et al. (1991)) had questioned the stability of a system of fixed exchange rates in a system with freedom 
of capital movements. But such attacks had not been observed. The currency crisis of 1992-1993, 
including the effect of the speculative attacks against the franc, forced a precise examination as to 
whether the EMS has been the theatre of such attacks. Research on these issues is just beginning (see, 
in particular, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993)). The reports of the monetary authorities blame the 
economic policies of the countries that had to devalue and had previously refused to make necessary 
adjustments to parities. The authorities now advocate a more flexible system (Monetary Committee 
(1993)). But if it were confirmed that the EMS can be subject to multiple equilibria, the merits of its 
continuation beyond a transitional period would be seriously in question. 
Is the single currency necessary? 
The Treaty on European Union states that after stopping the conversion of currencies the European 
Council ‘shall take other measures necessary for the rapid introduction of the ECU as the single 
currency’. This vague wording opens the possibility of a phase III, during which the parities would be 
fixed and bands of fluctuation completely eliminated, but where different national monetary units 
continue to be in use. This precaution refers in fact to the technical time required for the introduction of 
the new currency but it raises questions about the interconnection of payment systems and about the 
cost/benefits of the single currency.  
From a macroeconomic perspective, the irrevocable fixing of parities is equivalent to the introduction of 
a single currency. In particular, it strictly imposes the same degree of centralisation of monetary 
decisions. Micro-economically, the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates should lead to a transition to ECU 
interbank transactions and the ‘wholesale’ market, provided that the central banking system keeps its 
                                               
3
 Note, however, that despite the rationalisation given by Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), applied studies have not 
been able to highlight the supposed benefits of disinflation in the EMS. See among recent works, Egebo and 
Englander (1992), or Blanchard and Mute (1993). De Grauwe (1989) even considers that the EMS has increased the 
cost of disinflation policies by preventing the use of the exchange rate and thereby imposing the gradualist 
strategies. 
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accounts in ECU and that governments denominate their debt in that currency (Kenen (1992)). One can 
well imagine the development of the single currency limited to the financial sector. However, there are 
differences between a monetary union simply based on fixed exchange rates and a monetary union with 
a single currency. In the case of maintaining separate currencies, the reduction of transaction costs 
related to monetary unification would not be fully exploited, the disciplines of the monetary union 
would be less visible to households and employees and finally, the credibility of the monetary union 
would be weaker (Emerson et al. (1991)). 
So there is an advantage, no doubt substantial, to go through with the logic of unification and to 
substitute national currencies with a single currency quickly. The introduction of the ECU, however, can 
done using either of two alternative strategies, gradualism and the 'big bang'.  
The big choices of the Treaty 
Basically, the Maastricht Treaty is characterised by two major choices: to entrust the conduct of 
monetary policy to a single Central Bank, to guarantee its independence, and assign its aim as  stability 
of prices; and that of preserving the autonomy of national budgetary policies while supporting them 
with devices designed to ensure budgetary discipline.  
The independence of the Central Bank 
It is easy to decide on the principle of a Central Bank in any unified monetary space so that decisions are 
universally binding on all members. If several monetary authorities coexisted, each would have an 
incentive to increase monetary creation so as to increase revenues from seigniorage (Krugman (1989b)), 
or to promote businesses within its jurisdiction. Each member passes on to the others the costs of its 
inflationary policy and this quickly lead to a chaotic situation. The situation of the ruble zone provides a 
striking illustration (Big (1993)). The independence of the Central Bank is therefore necessary to 
maintain irrevocably fixed exchange rates but the choice to assign a priority objective of price stability is 
debatable. 
In France and the UK, the tradition is that monetary policy is part of the range of policy instruments 
available to the authorities to achieve economic and social objectives that they set. In such a context, 
the Central Bank must remain in the service of general economic policy. In Germany and the 
Netherlands, the Central Bank, in contrast, is independent and specialised: it has the primary task to 
achieve a goal of price stability. Thus, the monetary instrument is assigned to a specific objective - the 
fight against inflation - and the institution that manages it is protected against pressures which could 
make it deviate from its purpose. 
These two competing models of monetary organisation each have advantages and disadvantages. The 
first allows authorities to conduct discretionary policy using all the instruments of macroeconomic 
policy, without being trapped in a rigid assignment. Depending on the situation and the nature of tax 
instruments used, it is possible to vary the assignment, and thus for example to assign a fiscal policy 
target price and the monetary policy objective of growth and employment (for an illustration of the 
gains of the joint use of both instruments in a monetary union, and Villa Sterdyniak see (1993)). In a 
setting that Tinbergen, such flexibility is preferable. But as shown by Barro and Gordon (1983), the lack 
of specific objectives has a cost, because private agents expect the reactions of monetary authorities 
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and adopt behaviors that can negate the effects on the real economy. This is why many countries, 
including France, assigned specific objectives to monetary policy. Assigning to the central bank a specific 
task and making it independent gives credibility to the objective of low inflation in the eyes of private 
agents and can overcome the disadvantages of discretionary policies. They learn, through experience, 
that the central bank is not ready to sacrifice this goal for the immediate benefits of supporting growth. 
The downside is, of course, that economic policy loses its flexibility and the possibilities of coordination 
between monetary and fiscal policies. 
Economic theory and recent empirical research provides arguments for the independence of a central 
bank. Among others, the theoretical work of Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), and 
Cohen and Michel (1990) suggest that the cost of maintaining flexibility in the assignment of 
instruments is at a cost of a higher level of average inflation without gains in terms of growth. Applied 
available studies confirm the lack of positive correlation between inflation and growth in the medium 
term. They also indicate that, to the extent it can be quantified, the degree of independence of the 
central bank is negatively correlated with the level of inflation (Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) 
Alesina and Summers (1990) and Cukiermann, Webb and Neypati (1992)). In other words, the 
independence of the central bank results in lower inflation without a cost to growth. This valid statistical 
correlation over a long time obviously excludes either exceptions to the rule or temporary deviations, or 
the influence of other factors such as the degree of consensus around the goal of controlling inflation. 
The economic developments of the past two decades indicate that these arguments should be taken 
seriously. The development and the deregulation of financial markets affect the conduct of monetary 
policy: the markets interpret the signals sent by the authorities and react to changes in the value of a 
particular instrument. Economic policy is thus less an engineering art in which the important thing is to 
have a range as wide as possible instruments. It is increasingly a game between policymakers and 
private agents, in which the clarity of objectives and continuity of decisions are conditions to the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. 
In a monetary union, the choice of an independent central bank is needed more so, as shown in a series 
of articles by Laskar (1991a, 1991b and 1993). Indeed, the choice of exchange rate flexible, asymmetric 
and symmetric monetary union depends on the degree of independence of central banks. Several 
arguments are then used to argue that independence is in favour of monetary union: 
-even in the event of complete convergence of savings and perfect symmetry of shocks, it may be that a 
flexible exchange system is preferred over a monetary union that does not have an independent Central 
Bank because of Rogoff's argument (1985)4. D. Laskar shows, however, that when a central bank is 
independent, a monetary union is always less advantageous than a flexible exchange rate system;  a 
monetary union with an independent Central Bank is less inflationary which helps low inflation 
countries; moreover, as the specific shocks affecting each of the member countries tend to partially 
offset each other, the need to use monetary policy for the purpose of stabilising the economy in the 
                                               
4
The so-called ‘counterproductive cooperation’ argument. In this case, the monetary union is equivalent to a 
cooperation between central banks in flexible exchange rate system. 
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face of shocks, is reduced. The European Central Bank can thus be more concerned with the general 
objective of price stability. 
Finally, there is an institutional argument for a central bank independent. In a decentralised budgetary 
organisation, monetary policy assumes a greater share of the responsibility of the overall political 
economy. Federal states can respond to this situation by choosing an independent Central Bank. 
The Statute of the European Central Bank (ECB) ensures that its independence will be at least as strong 
as that of Central Banks national authorities - including the Bundesbank51. On the other hand, the action 
of the ECB will not immediately benefit from the same legitimacy with public opinion as that of Central 
Banks around which have a long-standing, solid consensus (Reeh (1993)). 
Independence does not imply, however, (and must not imply) absence of dialogue and 
coordination. The Treaty and the Protocol on the Statute of the ECB specify its relations with the other 
European institutions. This obviously does not guarantee the quality of the dialogue, but at least 
corrects the image of splendid isolation of the future ECB that is sometimes given. Beyond procedures, a 
balance will have to be found between monetary and economic authorities in a practice reconciling 
respect for areas of competence and effective coordination. This is how the ECB can acquire its full 
legitimacy from national opinions. 
Budgetary discipline 
If the creation of a single, independent Central Bank brings together a broad consensus among 
economists, the question of whether to impose constraints on national fiscal policies is more 
controversial. The need to maintain the autonomy of national budgetary policies is hardly 
disputed. Macro-economically, it results from the need to compensate for the loss of the monetary 
instrument at the national level to cope with shocks of an asymmetrical nature, even though it is true 
that budgetary and monetary policy are perfectly substitutable. It is consistent with the chosen option 
of a Community budget of very small size and the maintenance of the Member States in most of the 
budgetary functions. Debate on the one hand, on budgetary discipline, i.e. the usefulness or otherwise 
of set limits on deficits and public debts and, on the other hand, on the degree of desirable coordination 
in a monetary union. 
 
From an economic point of view, it is justified that excessive deficits be subject to Community 
multilateral surveillance procedures accompanied by a binding procedure based on safeguards (a) if an 
externality occurs between other members of the union, and (b) if the only mechanisms of the financial 
market are not sufficient to ensure compliance with budgetary discipline. These two points have been 
widely debated (for a recent overview, cf. Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993)). 
The strongest argument for the existence of an externality is a solvency argument. It is based on the 
idea that a threat of default by a Member State would limit the ability of the Central Bank to conduct 
                                               
5 The ECB will be independent of the Commission, Parliament, and governments. Its leaders will be appointed for 
eight years and will not be revocable. She will face twelve governments, which gives it greater de facto 
independence. And its status will be guaranteed by an international treaty, instead of national law.  
 
 Chris Kirrane 
24 
 
monetary policy of their choice. In a way, the Central Bank would be forced, if not to a bailout, at least 
to avoid precipitating the insolvency of a Member State by raising interest rates.6 In that case, the other 
Member States would suffer from overly lax global monetary policy. And in case the country concerned 
would choose to withdraw from the union, the credibility of the union would be achieved (Emerson et 
al., (1991)). Some authors dispute that this possibility is likely (Buiter et al., (1993)). But it is difficult to 
exclude it. 
Another argument, implicitly present in the treaty, is that a union’s monetary policy could have a bias 
towards excessive deficits because of the dilution of the eviction effects and the relaxation of the 
equilibrium constraint outside, and apart from any problem of solvency, these deficits 
affect the overall savings-investment balance within the European Community. This argument is less 
robust for two reasons: incentives for budget management will be increased as the option of debt 
monetisation will be excluded; the savings-investment balance does not depend on public finances, but 
also private behaviour (the Italian case illustrates this clearly). 
The argument in favour of organised discipline is based on the presumption of the limited ability of 
markets to properly value insolvency risks for sovereign debtors, particularly in a situation where the 
non-bailout commitment might lack credibility, and a doubt about the ability of governments to respond 
in an appropriate manner to market signals. A number of studies have attempted to appreciate this 
argument by analysing the situation of federations such as the United and Canada. The most precise 
(see, for example, Goldstein and Woglom (1991)) show a significant relationship between the level of 
debt of a State and the cost of its bonds. However, in this as in others, a doubt persists about the quality 
of the valuation of risk by the market (Artus (1990)), and the work of political economy is to question 
the reaction of governments to an increase in their cost of debt (Tanzi (1991)). If one of these arguments 
is true, it is justified to introduce constraints in order to avoid excessive deficits. 
Two types of rules have been introduced in the Treaty: on the one hand, general rules prohibiting: 1) 
monetary financing, 2) privileged access by States to capital markets; 3) financial solidarity (no bail-out); 
on the other hand, the principle of exclusion of excessive deficits and the corresponding procedure, 
assorted quantitative criteria.7 The criteria selected were subject to many critics (Buiter et al., (1993), 
Delessy et al., (1993), Masson et al. Melitz (1991)). In addition to their implications for the transition, the 
main problem is that it is not known exactly what they are aiming for. The text of the treaty oscillates 
between the notion of sustainability of the public debt (Article 109) and reference to the ‘golden rule’ 
(article 104 C3), and also takes into account the balance between savings and investment. 
Beyond the debate on the theoretical basis, the criteria reflect principles of good management generally 
accepted in a steady state. But they present problems in a recession: the spontaneous evolution of 
public accounts over the period 1990-1993 indicates that the margin of 3% allowed for the public deficit 
is too narrow, unless one agrees that a deteriorated economic situation falls within the exceptions 
allowed by the treaty. They also pose a problem for the transition: the 60% public debt threshold is out 
                                               
6
This risk seems higher than that of a budget bail-out. 
7
 The purpose of this procedure is, in particular, to prevent the deficit of the public sector to permanently exceed 
3% of GDP and its debt 60% of GDP. 
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of reach for several countries by the end of the decade, then some of them, like Belgium, have been 
living for almost ten years in a de facto monetary union. 
The excessive deficit procedure is complex. It assumes in particular an assessment of the exceptional or 
permanent nature of the overrun criteria. Unlike the case of monetary policy, it implies a difference 
between countries, and this can lead to coalitions or bargains whose stakes go beyond the scope of 
fiscal policy. In fact, only practice will decide on the actual scope of this procedure. Its credibility will 
depend on its deterrence and its reaction to national opinions to a European Community 
recommendation or notice. Thus, its possible limits are probably less loopholes (valuation of assets) or 
procedural than to the political nature of the decision. 
The coordination of economic policies 
In Europe, the coordination of economic policies has, for more than decade, been dominated by the 
imperatives of convergence. This is understandable: in the context of the EMS, it was important to bring 
closer the nominal performance of states.  
The transition to EMU follows the same logic, which follow the convergence criteria set out in the 
Treaty. It has already been said that among these criteria, those aimed at public finances are 
problematic, because of the extent of the accumulated debt stock in some countries and the 
deterioration of the economic situation. On the basis of information available at mid-term 1993, it is 
clear that for a majority of countries a strict application of criteria for public finances would delay 
participation in the monetary union beyond the end of the decade, even if these countries 
implemented, with the costs that this entails, vigorous policies to correct their public accounts. The 
credibility of the whole process envisaged by the treaty would be seriously affected. That is why it is 
important to clarify, as soon as possible, the interpretation of public finance criteria, retaining for the 
public deficit the more realistic goal of a sufficient primary surplus to put the debt ratio on a robust 
downward path to the vagaries of growth and interest rates, and taking into account the economic 
situation in the judgment focused on the public deficit. It is also necessary to prevent a situation where, 
in a poor growth environment, several large countries would budget for correction policies 
simultaneously without taking into account their external impacts. In such a case of lack of coordination, 
the recovery could be penalised. The Treaty provides, by Article 103 (which will be applicable upon 
ratification), the instrument of taking into account the international dimension of the convergence 
process. It is important that it be makes use of it. 
The question arises more generally whether the treaty satisfactorily organises the coordination of 
macroeconomic policies in the field of Community. Some authors (Melitz (1991), Buiter et al (1993)) 
argue that such coordination is useless: for them, the external effects of are low because of the limited 
integration of goods markets and adverse effects on the markets for goods and capital in a fixed 
exchange rate regime. These arguments of an empirical nature are subject to debate: according to the 
models, the external effects of fiscal policies vary significantly (Whitley (1991)). According to some 
studies, they can be strong enough to call for budget coordination (Team Mimosa (1989)). Moreover, as 
noted by Cohen and Wyplosz (1989), the monetary union policy creates a new externality between the 
participating countries. To the extent that they are not indifferent to the external balance of the union 
taken as a whole (for example because of the imperfect substitutability of assets and the resulting 
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exchange rate effects), they can share an objective of external balance. In this case, coordination of 
budgetary policies would be imposed. Article 103 of the Treaty provides that Heads of State and 
Government fix large economic policy guidelines. However, there is interest in strengthening 
coordination procedures by setting up diagnostic devices, to alert and to follow up. 
French Economic Policy and Emu 
Although the combination of the currency crisis and the deterioration of (with the resulting 
deterioration of public finances) in European countries) casts doubt on the realisation of the monetary 
union policy, and leads to the anticipation that it will not be implemented by 1997, one of the options 
provided for by the Treaty, the single currency project is the objective of French economic policy.8 It is 
therefore important to consider what will be the implications of participation in the single currency and 
how French economic policy can be prepared during the period covered by the 11th Plan. At the cost of 
a certain simplification, it is enlightening to distinguish implications of EMU for the stabilisation of short-
medium term fluctuations and those that affect growth in the medium term. In the first case, it is 
necessary to examine the role of economic policies in response to temporary disruptions. In the second, 
it is a question of examining the paths to growth in the medium term (Kirrane (1993)) 
Economic stabilisation policies 
Monetary union will not eliminate the asymmetries between countries of the European Community, 
whether from shocks affecting them or from structures and behaviors that determine responses to 
common shocks. As has been said, the available body of work indicates that symmetric shocks are rather 
predominant in the disturbances affecting countries of the European Community. However, 
asymmetries will remain because of the differences in structure, institutions and behavior among 
national economies. Some studies even argue that they will increase in the long term because of the 
geographical specialisation phenomena that the single market will bring about (Eichengreen (1993)). 
In a world characterised by nominal rigidities, markets do not do not adjust instantly. A decline in 
demand for goods translates into loss of income and unemployment. In a monetary union, a country 
cannot use devaluation to accelerate the adjustment of real wages. This is the main cost of monetary 
union. This cost is offset by the disappearance of the current balance constraint vis-à-vis other members 
of the union. The intensity of the external equilibrium constraint is already subject to discussion about 
the freedom of movement of capital (Cooper (1987)).9 
In monetary union, the balance of payments current account vis-à-vis EMU will cease to be a 
constraint. On the other hand, there will still be a solvency constraint on the national economy, the 
nation, like any borrowing agent, must be able to pay off debts and repay them when due. A current 
account deficit, resulting for example from a funded capital accumulation by other countries of the 
Community, should not be of concern, when competitive production capacities are created 
guaranteeing future repayments. 
                                               
8
 The option of an acceleration leading to the formation of a restricted monetary union is not retained here. See 
on this subject the report of the Workshop (Pisani-Ferry and Bismut (1993)). 
9
 See also the important literature on the works of Feldstein and Horioka (1987).  
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If it is admitted that the private sector remains solvent (what a good functioning of the markets should 
ensure), the national solvency constraint is reduced to a solvency problem of general government. To 
suppose the excessive deficit criteria are respected, the external balance may depart from equilibrium 
for a long time, without movements of savings within the Community (Italianer and Pisani Ferry 
(1993)). In other words, the financial aspect of an external debt will be completely separate from the 
monetary aspects attached to it as long as the currencies remain separate and at the risk of default of 
the borrower can be superimposed or be substituted by a currency risk. It is likely that the single 
currency will lead to a further reduction of the correlation between national saving and national 
investment. The monetary union should completely free the Member States of the external equilibrium 
constraint in the short term, and better allocation of savings within the Community. However, the 
external balance of the Community vis-à-vis the rest of the world will not disappear and, in case of 
excessive imbalance, each country will have to lend attention to its contribution to the overall balance.  
Thus, if we stick to a ‘tinbergennian’ perspective, the participation in a monetary union implies vis-à-vis 
the other members of the Union to both the loss of an instrument (the monetary or exchange 
instrument) and the loss objective (the external balance). In reality, one does not compensate exactly 
the other. In a random universe, the loss of an instrument leads to a loss of control capacity over the 
economy (Wyplosz (1992)). This loss can lead to stronger cyclical fluctuations and leads to the search for 
other instruments for stabilisation purposes. The gain of loosening the current balance constraint should 
not be overestimated. In a free movement of capital regime, this constraint is already no longer 
instantaneous; an intertemporal solvency constraint will subsist in a monetary union. On the other 
hand, the monetary union will, above all, release the economies from adverse effects in short-term 
capital movements. 
In case of asymmetric shocks, neither labour mobility nor budget can be used as partial absorption 
mechanisms as happens in the United States and Canada. As a result of the many research projects 
brought about by the prospect of European Monetary Union, inter-regional adjustments in a union’s 
monetary structures such as those in the United States and Canada are better known: labour mobility is 
an important channel of adjustment, while wage flexibility plays a very limited role (Blanchard and Katz 
(1992)); through the automatic interplay of taxation and transfers, the federal budget absorbs around 
20% of shocks on the primary revenue of states (Sachs and Sala-y-Martin (1992), von Hagen (1991), 
Goodhart and Smith (1992), Bayoumi and Masson (1993), Italianer and Pisani-Ferry (1992)). 
Consideration could be given to providing the European Community budget with a specific mechanism 
to absorb some of the transitional fluctuations in Member States income. Such a mechanism would 
make it possible to partially overcome the lack of labour mobility and thus strengthen the robustness of 
EMU in the face of shocks. In partial compensation for the abandonment of the exchange rate 
instrument, it would provide countries engaged in monetary union with a form of insurance. It can be 
shown that the budgetary cost would be very low and that the degree of stabilisation would be close to 
that provided by the American federal budget (Italianer and Pisani-Ferry (1992)). The potential 
effectiveness of such a mechanism is however the subject of discussion (Mélitz and Vori (1993)). The 
Treaty on the European Union did not adopt this approach.10 It will therefore be necessary rely on 
                                               
10 The Treaty only contemplates the possibility of exceptional financial aid (Article 103A). 
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national response capabilities and compensate for the lack of mobility through the use of fiscal policy 
and greater flexibility of wages. 
Will the monetary union affect the effectiveness of fiscal policy? On the one hand, the single currency 
should make the policy more effective because of the dilution of the eviction and appraisal effects that 
follow a fiscal expansion conducted in a single country under flexible foreign exchange rates. On the 
other hand, in the opposite direction, economic integration increases ‘leakage’ that limits the Keynesian 
impact of a fiscal stimulus, but it is thought that this second effect will take longer to appear and should 
remain less important for an economy the size of France.11 If it is clear that fiscal policy is not an exact 
substitute for the exchange rate, monetary union is therefore likely to give an increased role to the fiscal 
stabilisation policy. It will therefore be necessary to release budgetary margins to let the automatic 
stabilisers play without jeopardising the medium-term objectives of fiscal policy. 
A key role, however, will be the flexibility of prices and wages which will be for all countries a 
fundamental mechanism of adjustment to shocks. In the absence of nominal flexibility of prices and 
wages, the adjustment will do by quantitative rationing, that is, by bankruptcies and 
unemployment. Instead of governments adapting wage and social behaviour to drive economic policy, 
in a monetary union, monetary policy will be given and social behaviour will have to adapt to it (Boyer 
(1993)).  
However, this constraint will not mean the prevalence of a single model of social relations: to a large 
extent, each country may, depending on its preferences and its system of social relations, choose 
channels by which they will exercise this necessary flexibility. In terms of wages, this flexibility can take 
several alternative forms such as profit-sharing type mechanisms or wage indexing, between which a 
choice is possible. Moreover, it is not excluded that EMU lead to renewed use of income’s policy, for 
example through the use of tax incentive instruments. 
Growth and employment 
Having transferred the use of the monetary policy instruments to Community level, and furthermore 
reserved the budgetary instrument for the purpose of stabilisation, the governments of the Member 
States will no longer have macroeconomic policy instruments to support growth in the medium 
term. They will not be able to rely on repeated devaluations nor drive policies on real interest rates or to 
jeopardise the equilibrium of public finances. In fact, these constraints result less from EMU than from 
decompartmentalisation of the financial markets which intervened in the eighties. In France, the 
renunciation of repeated devaluations preceded the formation of the single currency project. Many 
European countries have undertaken adjustment of their public finances well before the criteria for 
Maastricht. The macroeconomic disciplines of EMU will therefore not differ basically to those which the 
economies have gradually joined at the end of the experiments of the last twenty years. But they will 
impose themselves with even greater force on the countries of the European Community. Is that to say 
that they will be constantly forced to keep pace with the growth of their partners or that of the 
European Community as a whole? 
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 Fiscal policy has already lost most of its national effectiveness in small, very open economies like Belgium. 
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Stronger growth will not be sustainable in the long term by price competitiveness gained by the 
moderation of prices and wages leading to lower inflation than the European Community average. Such 
a policy of ‘competitive disinflation’12 is adapted to an adjustment process in which a country must strive 
to regain competitiveness price eroded by disinflation while respecting the constraint of fixed exchange 
rates: such was the case of France in recent years (Blanchard and Muet (1993)). But it would be 
dangerous for such strategies to be pursued in monetary union regime, for three reasons. 
Firstly, he Treaty entrusts the Central Bank with the objective of price stability, it is redundant that the 
same objective should be pursued simultaneously by the national authorities, for example by means of 
an income policy. Differences in relative prices will only reflect the appreciation or depreciation of the 
exchange rate to the real needs of adjustment to asymmetric shocks, as in the case of federations (Poloz 
(1990), De Grauwe (1992)). If each country were to set a relative inflation target, a fundamental 
balancing mechanism characteristic of currency unions would be blocked. 
Secondly, the setting of an inflation differential target can only be interpreted as an adjustment process 
otherwise it would be a non-cooperative policy to achieve competitiveness gains through 
macroeconomic policy and not by proper management of the companies. This is a zero sum game (or 
even negative): if all countries were to set an inflation target less than one point above average, it would 
be logically impossible for them to succeed and the only result would be either high unemployment or 
too lax monetary policy, in the event that the ECB seeks to compensate for the excess austerity of 
national policies. 
Finally, in a monetary union regime, lower inflation is not accompanied by any decrease in nominal 
interest rates and therefore an equivalent increase in the ex-post real interest rate. This is the big 
difference to a situation of disinflation in fixed exchange rates, in which the control of prices allows a 
reduction in depreciation expectations and risk premiums embedded in interest rates. 
EMU will not, however, require governments to passively follow the average evolution. It will instead 
lead them to focus on micro-economic competitiveness and growth, and to stimulate the national 
performance through supply-side policies and the search for social consensus. The ability of an economy 
to support a growth differential depends on its ability to derive non-price competitiveness gains by 
investment efforts, the quality of its allocation and the extension of the range of varieties offered. In this 
perspective, the effectiveness of the State in production of public goods, the adaptation of tax levy 
systems and social benefits for an economic efficiency and social equity, the quality of public 
infrastructure, the impact of research spending, the performance of the education system will be for 
each country key drivers of competitiveness and growth in the medium term. This is why the prospect of 
EMU draws upon all of the consequences of recent research on the determinants of growth and the 
impact of public policies on the growth of economies. 
Much the same goes for employment. Growth of labour resources of the European economies over the 
last ten or twenty next few years will not be homogeneous, and international mobility will remain a 
marginal adjustment channel. These differences can only be compensated partially by the growth 
                                               
12
Competitive disinflation has been the subject of many interpretations. We by this means a policy of disinflation 
aiming at a certain gap inflation, positive or negative, with a partner country (or a group of countries) 
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differentials, and all the more so if the stock of unemployed is taken into account. EMU may create 
favourable conditions for European growth, but it will be up to each country to make use of the 
instruments at its disposal to reverse the spontaneous trend in labour productivity. 
How to prepare for a change in monetary regime? 
The French economy is preparing to change its political economic regime. From the first oil shock to the 
end of the eighties, concepts and objectives have been dominated by the notion of external constraint. 
‘Competitive disinflation’ itself was part of this culture, since it found a justification in the volume gains 
that allowed (until the devaluations of autumn 1992) the progress of price competitiveness, as much or 
more than on the benefits of price stability themselves. The Plan played a leading role in the analysis 
and pedagogy of the disciplines of the open economy. In the coming years, this constraint will complete 
to fade, while it will be substituted for a flexibility constraint of prices and wages. 
This perspective is an extension of the efforts undertaken since more than ten years. But if the success 
of disinflation is indicative of the scale of these efforts, econometric research does not confirm that 
price and wage behaviour have changed in an obvious way (Blanchard and Mute (1993), Egebo and 
Englander (1992)). The coming years must therefore be used to continue the preparation of the French 
economy for the new rules of the game. It will be necessary to tackle the search for greater 
responsiveness of prices and wages to internal or external disturbances and strengthening of the micro-
economic instruments of stimulation for growth. Economic agents will have to learn to listen to the 
signals that the Central Bank will send them. At the same time, the framework of reference for 
macroeconomic policy will need to be developed, with the completion of the adjustment symbolised by 
competitive disinflation and the renewal of hierarchy objectives. Finally, it will be necessary to develop a 
pedagogy of the disciplines associated with EMU and organise a social dialogue. 
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